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We argue that creativity is influenced by the dynamic interplay of positive and
negative affect: High creativity results if a person experiences an episode of negative
affect that is followed by a decrease in negative affect and an increase in positive affect,
a process referred to as an “affective shift.” An experience-sampling study with 102
full-time employees provided support for the hypotheses. An experimental study with
80 students underlined the proposed causal effect of an affective shift on creativity. We
discuss practical implications for facilitating creativity in organizations.
Creativity—the development of new and useful
ideas—is critical for human adaptation in complex
and dynamic environments (Amabile, 1996). Given
the complexity and dynamics of today’s organiza-
tions, knowledge of how creativity can be stimu-
lated is critical for an effective managerial practice.
Among the determinants of creativity, affective
states stand out as factors that can be influenced
and that have been consistently linked to creativity
(Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). More specifically,
a vast body of research has confirmed that positive
affect, which encompasses feelings such as happi-
ness and enthusiasm, leads to high creativity (Isen,
1999). This evidence provides a solid basis for rec-
ommending that creativity in organizations can be
stimulated by cultivating feelings of happiness and
enthusiasm (Amabile, 2000). However, it is ques-
tionable whether positive affect alone suffices for
creativity. As one of the most complex mental func-
tions, creativity may draw from the whole spec-
trum of affective experiences—and the cognitive
processes they elicit—including negative feelings
such as anxiety, frustration, and distress (George &
Zhou, 2007; Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997). If this is
the case, a one-sided focus on positive affect may
fall short of explaining creativity and of unleashing
people’s creative potentials.
The present article attempts to move toward a
balanced and dynamic account of affect that ac-
knowledges the significance of positive as well as
negative affect for creativity. Our core proposition
is illustrated by the analogy of the phoenix: The
phoenix is a mythological bird that burns to ashes
and subsequently resurrects from its own ashes to
become a colorful bird once more. It repeats this
cycle over and over again. The figure of the phoenix
appears in numerous cultures and has found its
way to modern language in the proverb “like a
phoenix rising from the ashes” (Van den Broek,
1972). With some equivalence to a phoenix’s
renewal—which depends on a preceding phase of
decline—the emergence of new ideas is often pre-
ceded by and depends on a phase of negative affect.
We argue that new ideas result as a consequence of
a dynamic process in which a person experiences a
phase of negative affect and subsequently leaves
negative affect behind and enters a state of high
positive affect.
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In terms of the phoenix analogy, past research on
the affect-creativity link has primarily focused on
the rise of the phoenix and has found a close link
between positive affect and creativity. It has paid
less attention to the phoenix’s preceding decline,
that is, to the role negative affect plays in the cre-
ative process, and the available evidence regarding
this role is inconsistent (Baas et al., 2008). More-
over, research has often neglected the dynamic na-
ture of affect. A person’s affective experience
changes continuously; emotions rise and fall in
response to external events, and moods are subject
to ongoing, gradual change (Weiss & Cropanzano,
1996). Theories of self-regulation emphasize that
change in affect and the interplay of positive and
negative affect have critical functions (Carver &
Scheier, 1990; Kuhl, 2000; McClelland, 1987).
However, neglecting this theoretical notion, empir-
ical research has mostly considered isolated affec-
tive states rather than the dynamic interplay of
positive and negative affect to be a determinant of
creativity. In this article, we address this limitation.
We aim to advance the understanding of the affect-
creativity link by specifying the dynamic interplay
between positive and negative affect that leads to
creativity.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Adaptive human functioning depends on the reg-
ulating influence of positive and negative affect
on perception and cognition (e.g., Rothermund,
Voss, & Wentura, 2008). Positive and negative af-
fect fluctuate over time, and fluctuations in affect
are associated with changes in a person’s atten-
tional focus and mode of thinking (Friedman &
Förster, 2010). Positive and negative affect fluctu-
ate on two distinct dimensions that exhibit a neg-
ative correlation (Watson, 1988). That is, positive
and negative affect can both be present within a
time interval; however, as they are mutually inhib-
itory, the simultaneous presence of high positive
and high negative affect at any moment is rare
(Fong, 2006; Schmukle, Egloff, & Burns, 2002).
A conceptual framework that integrates research
on how positive and negative affect regulate psy-
chological functioning is personality systems inter-
action (PSI) theory (for a detailed discussion, see
Kuhl [2000, 2001]). The distinctive characteristic of
this theory is its focus on change in affect. It can
therefore serve as a guiding framework for devel-
oping a theoretical rationale about the dynamics of
affect underlying creativity. According to the the-
ory, positive affect regulates whether cognition pro-
ceeds in a controlled, slow, and sequential mode
(low positive affect) or in an automatic, fast, and
parallel mode (high positive affect). If positive af-
fect is low, people can objectively analyze a situa-
tion and deliberate on potential courses of action
(Carver & White, 1994; Kazén & Kuhl, 2005;
Schwarz & Bless, 1991). An increase in positive
affect leads to behavioral activation, so that previ-
ously developed intentions can be implemented
(Kuhl & Kazén, 1999). After an increase in positive
affect, behavioral control proceeds in an intuitive
and effortless manner, and cognitive processing
broadens and includes exploratory thoughts and
actions (Fredrickson, 2005).
Negative affect regulates whether attention is
narrow and focused on isolated elements (high neg-
ative affect) or broad and inclusive of the context
(low negative affect) (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). If
negative affect is high, situations or events that
threaten a person’s goals are examined in detail,
and incongruent information is processed in a
sequential-analytic manner (Bless, Clore, Schwarz,
Golisano, Rabe, & Wölk, 1996). If negative affect
decreases, information processing moves away
from isolated elements and becomes more inclu-
sive of the larger context (Förster & Higgins, 2005).
Associative networks of memory are activated,
which form the basis of a person’s integrated rep-
resentation of the self and the environment (Koole
& Jostmann, 2004). These networks provide the per-
son with an overview of internal states, autobio-
graphical experiences, and action opportunities
and form the basis for complex cognitive opera-
tions such as creativity (Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl,
2003). When negative affect decreases, information
that was processed during the preceding episode of
negative affect can be integrated into the person’s
associative memory networks.
Two general implications for creativity follow
from this theory. First, both positive and negative
affect play important roles, as they are associated
with distinct cognitive functions that can contrib-
ute to creativity. This proposition converges with
George and Zhou’s (2002, 2007) dual-tuning model
and De Dreu, Baas, and Nijstad’s (2008) dual path-
way to creativity model. Both models suggest that
positive and negative affect can lead to creativity.
More specifically, George and Zhou’s (2007) dual-
tuning model also suggests that both positive and
negative affect are to some extent necessary for
creativity due to their distinct “tuning” effects on
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cognition. The limitation of the dual-tuning model
is, however, that it does not explicitly address the
dynamics of positive and negative affect.
The necessity of taking the dynamics of affect
into account is the second implication that follows
from PSI theory for creativity. According to the
theory, the dynamics of affect enable the integra-
tion of cognitive functions that are necessary for
creativity. This is a novel idea that has not yet been
systematically developed and tested. In the follow-
ing, we develop this idea in two steps. We first
posit that the sequence of negative affect followed
by positive affect is linked to creativity. Second, we
argue that this sequence is achieved through a
change process that involves both dimensions of
affect and that change in affect plays a distinct role
in the creative process. Figure 1 illustrates the core
idea of this article. The dynamic trajectories of
positive affect and negative affect displayed in Fig-
ure 1A should lead to higher creativity as compared
to the situation displayed in Figure 1B, in which
negative affect is at a constant, low level.
FIGURE 1
Consequence of Variation in Affective Processes for Creativitiy
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Affect and Creativity
An extensive body of research has shown that the
presence of positive affect increases the likelihood
that new and useful ideas will be developed (Baas
et al., 2008; Binnewies & Wörnlein, 2011). Positive
affect leads to higher creativity because it activates
cognition and increases cognitive flexibility (De
Dreu et al., 2008; Fredrickson, 2001). Amabile, Bar-
sade, Mueller, and Staw’s (2005) in-depth field
study, for example, examined the creative perfor-
mances of members of project teams on a daily
basis over the course of several months. The au-
thors found support for a linear relation between
positive affect and creativity: The more positive
events participants experienced and the higher
their level of positive affect, the better was their
creative performance.
On the basis of PSI theory, we argue that the
positive relation between positive affect and cre-
ativity is stronger when positive affect is preceded
by an episode of negative affect. Negative affect can
lay the foundation for creativity so that negative
affect at time 1 (t1) moderates the relation between
positive affect and creativity at time 2 (t2). Empiri-
cal evidence from different sources supports the
assumption that negative affect can contribute to
creativity. In experimental studies, De Dreu et al.
(2008) found that the induction of negative affect
increased the number of new ideas participants
generated, because participants showed higher per-
sistence at the task. Indirect evidence that negative
affect may play an important role in creativity is
provided by studies on characteristics of highly
creative people. Bipolar disorder and depression
appear to occur more frequently among highly cre-
ative people and their relatives as compared to the
general population (Feist, 1999; Jamison, 1995;
Ludwig, 1992). George and Zhou (2007) provided
evidence that negative affect can contribute to cre-
ativity in work settings. They found that the level of
negative affect employees experienced was posi-
tively related to supervisor ratings of creativity if
the level of positive affect was also high and if the
context was supportive.
Despite these findings, most studies report either
a negative or no relation between negative affect
and creativity (Baas et al., 2008). We argue that time
needs to be taken into account to resolve inconsis-
tent findings. At any given moment, the narrow
attentional focus associated with negative affect
hinders rather than facilitates creativity (Baumann
& Kuhl, 2002); however, negative affect contributes
to creativity through a lagged process that depends
on the subsequent presence of positive affect. Neg-
ative affect draws attention to problems and signals
that effort needs to be invested to solve a problem-
atic situation (Foo, Uy & Baron, 2009; George &
Zhou, 2002; Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993).
According to PSI theory, an episode of negative
affect is associated with a bottom-up mode of cog-
nitive processing that focuses on incongruent and
unexpected information (Kuhl, 2000); thereby, a
detailed and objective understanding of a situation
can be developed (Bless et al., 1996; Gasper, 2003;
Spering, Wagener, & Funke, 2005). The detection of
problems during a phase of negative affect can also
elicit incubation processes that result in new ideas
at a later point in time (Sio & Ormerod, 2009).
During a subsequent episode of positive affect, cog-
nitive flexibility and activation increase, and
knowledge is processed in a top-down manner
(Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Derryberry & Tucker,
1994). The presence of positive affect enables cre-
ativity, and new ideas likely emerge during an ep-
isode of positive affect. Yet, without a preceding
phase of negative affect to lay the foundation for
new ideas, positive affect should be less strongly
related to creativity. Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 1. Negative affect at time 1 moder-
ates the relation between positive affect at time
2 and creativity such that the relation is more
positive if negative affect at time 2 is high.
Affective Shift and Creativity
We next posit that a dynamic process that in-
volves change in affect between t1 and t2 underlies
the outlined sequence of affective states and is
linked to the emergence of new ideas. We refer to
this process as an affective shift. An affective shift
involves an increase in positive affect and a de-
crease in negative affect from t1 to t2 (see Figure
1A). An increase in positive affect from t1 to t2 is an
important component of an affective shift, because
positive affect at t1 will often not be at a high level
due to the presence of negative affect (Schmukle et
al., 2002). By means of an increase in positive affect
after an episode of negative affect, a person reaches
a state of high positive affect that enables the flex-
ible mode of thinking that can lead to creativity.
Note, however, that this does not imply that posi-
tive affect needs to be low at t1. In fact, creativity
should be facilitated if positive affect already co-
occurs with negative affect at t1 and then further
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increases. The creativity enhancing effect of posi-
tive affect unfolds over time and is more pro-
nounced for longer-lasting than for short-lived ep-
isodes of positive affect (Amabile et al., 2005).
An increase in positive affect should be more
strongly related to creativity if it is accompanied by
a decrease in negative affect. Although negative
affect can lay the foundation for creativity at a later
point in time, at any given moment, the presence of
negative affect impedes rather than enables creativ-
ity (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). Negative affect leads
to a tightening of cognitive processes on isolated
details and to a slow and sequential mode of cog-
nitive processing (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). The
emergence of new associations among remotely
connected concepts is therefore unlikely as long as
negative affect is high. According to PSI theory,
negative affect impedes accessibility of associative
networks of memory, which provide the founda-
tion for complex intuitive operations. For instance,
Baumann and Kuhl (2002) presented participants
with coherent word triplets of the remote associa-
tion test (e.g., “green,” “pass,” and “goat”). These
word triplets are connected by a common concept
(i.e., “mountain”). In the absence of negative affect,
participants implicitly realized that there was a
connection between such coherent word triplets as
compared to random word triplets, even if they
could not name the common concept. In the pres-
ence of negative affective stimuli, participants were
not able to see the connection. Negative affect thus
initially inhibits remote associations, which are an
important component of creativity (Mednick, 1962).
If negative affect decreases, the focus of cognitive
processing expands, which enables associations
among remotely connected concepts (Baumann &
Kuhl, 2002). PSI theory suggests that the process of
a decrease in negative affect has a critical function
for creativity. Activation of a person’s associative
networks of memory is strongest after a decrease in
negative affect; that is, activation is stronger if neg-
ative affect is first experienced and then down-
regulated, as compared to a situation in which no
negative affect was present (Kuhl, 2001). Due to the
activation of associative networks of memory, a
decrease in negative affect should broadly facilitate
new associations, so that new ideas can be devel-
oped that are not constrained by the cognitive con-
tent a person has focused on before the decrease in
negative affect. The adaptive value of new associa-
tions should be, however, particularly pronounced
if they relate to the incongruent information that
was previously processed. By means of an affective
shift, new associations can be formed that integrate
incongruent information that was processed during
a phase of negative affect with available knowledge
that is represented in extended memory networks.
For example, a person who fails on an important
task will experience negative affect and reflect on
the event such that an objective and detailed un-
derstanding is developed. After a decrease in neg-
ative affect, the ability to form new associations is
broadly augmented. If the cognitive representation
of the preceding failure experience is still accessi-
ble, new associations may be formed that relate to
and integrate the failure experience. For instance,
knowledge regarding how success was achieved on
other tasks may be associated with the failure ex-
perience, and the person can generate a new strat-
egy for handling the task.
High creativity should thus result if an increase
in positive affect is accompanied by a decrease in
negative affect. An increase of positive affect leads
to higher cognitive activation and flexible top-down
processing of existing knowledge (Baumann & Kuhl,
2005; Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). A decrease of
negative affect activates associative networks of
memory and enables the integration of information
that was processed in a bottom-up manner during
an episode of negative affect (Baumann & Kuhl,
2002). Change in negative affect should therefore
moderate the relation between change in positive
affect and creativity. Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 2. Change in negative affect from
time 1 to time 2 moderates the relation between
change in positive affect from time 1 to time 2
and creativity, such that an increase in positive
affect is more strongly related to creativity if
there is a decrease in negative affect.
We conducted two studies on the dynamic inter-
play of positive with negative affect and its relation
with creativity. In Study 1, we used experience-
sampling methodology and tested the hypotheses
in a field study. The relations between affect and
changes in affect within the time frame of one
workday were related to creativity during the day.
In Study 2, we applied an experimental design and
examined the causal effect of a short-term affective
shift on creativity.
STUDY 1
Methods
Participants and procedure.We recruited a het-
erogeneous sample of full-time employees in pro-
436 AprilAcademy of Management Journal
fessional jobs to allow for generalization across jobs
and industries. One of the primary concerns of
experience-sampling studies is that participants
commit themselves to answer surveys repeatedly.
To obtain a heterogeneous sample and to ensure
participants’ commitment, we used personal con-
tacts and directly contacted potential participants
to volunteer for the study. Working with a group of
students, we developed a list of people who held
professional jobs that demanded creativity. We
contacted each potential participant individually
and inquired about her or his willingness to sup-
port a scientific study on work behavior. As an
incentive, participants were offered feedback on
the results of the study. In the course of describing
the research design, we asked participants whether
their jobs called for the development of new and
useful ideas. All participants indicated that this
was the case.
We contacted 140 people in this way; 116 agreed
to participate in the study. As our main focus was
on within-person variability in creativity, it was
important that participants had completed the
daily questionnaire for at least three out of
five days. One hundred two participants met this
criterion and were included in the final sample
(final response rate: 73%). The 14 participants
whom we dropped from the final sample because
they had not provided answers for at least
three days did not differ significantly in demo-
graphic characteristics or on the variables used in
the study. Participants’ ages ranged from 20 to 57,
with an average age of 34 years. Forty-two percent
were women. Seventy-five percent of the partici-
pants held a university degree. The most frequent
professional backgrounds were business (34%),
psychology (18%), engineering (15%), IT-engineer-
ing (8%), and teaching (6%). Participants worked
for private as well as public organizations. Twenty-
seven percent worked in small companies with
fewer than 50 employees, 24 percent in companies
with fewer than 500 employees, and 44 percent in
organizations with more than 500 employees. Their
average tenure was 6.3 years.
Data collection was divided into two parts: First,
participants filled out a questionnaire to measure
personal characteristics and demographic control
variables. Second, in the following week, partici-
pants filled out a short online survey each morning
and at the end of each workday to measure positive
and negative affect and creativity. Each morning,
participants received an e-mail link to the online
questionnaire and were asked to respond to the
questionnaire after arriving at their office and be-
fore they started work. One hour before the sched-
uled end of their workday, which participants had
communicated to us before, they received a second
e-mail link. Participants were asked to respond to
the questionnaire after finishing work and before
leaving the office. On average, participants com-
pleted both the morning and evening question-
naires on 4.6 days, leading to a total sample of 475
pairs of morning and evening observations for 102
participants.
Control variables.We included age, gender, ten-
ure, highest educational level, and organizational
size as demographic control variables. To examine
validity of the daily measure of creativity, we in-
cluded a ten-itemmeasure of the Big Five Inventory
of personality (BFI-10) (Rammstedt & John, 2007).
This inventory measures each personality dimen-
sion with two items, and has been found to be both
reliable and valid. Rammstedt and John (2007) re-
ported the following average coefficients for the
five scales: part-whole correlation, .83; test-retest
reliability, .75; self-peer convergent validity corre-
lation, .44.
Creativity. At the end of each workday, partici-
pants reported the level of creativity for that day.
We used five items by Tierney, Farmer, and Graen
(1999); these were adapted to the level of the work-
day by Ohly and Fritz (2010). Example items are
“Today, I generated novel, but operable work-
related ideas” and “Today, I served as a good role
model for creativity.” Cronbach’s alpha for the five-
item creativity scale for the 475 days for which
participants provided creativity ratings was .84.
Positive and negative affect. Positive and nega-
tive affect were measured as psychological states
with the PANAS inventory each morning and at the
end of each workday (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). We refer to the morning measurement of
affect as t1 and to the measurement of affect at the
end of the workday as t2. We measured positive
affect by six items: excited, interested, strong, ac-
tive, inspired, and alert. We measured negative af-
fect by seven items: scared, guilty, distressed,
afraid, nervous, hostile, upset, and angry. In the
morning survey, the instructions were “Please in-
dicate how you feel this morning,” and participants
were asked to report their affective state for each
adjective on a five-point scale (1  “not at all,” 5 
“extremely”). Cronbach’s alphas were calculated
across the 475 morning observations; values were
.87 for the positive affect scale and .83 for the
negative affect scale. At the end of the workday,
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participants reported their affective state using the
same positive and negative affect adjectives (Cron-
bach’s alphas of .86 and .82, respectively). Partici-
pants were instructed to indicate how they felt, on
average, during that workday, and to refer to the
time period since they had responded to the morn-
ing survey.
Analyses. For all analyses, we used random co-
efficient modeling to predict creativity by the day-
specific variables. Repeated measures data from the
daily surveys were nested within persons. This
nesting led to a two-level model, with positive and
negative affect at t1 (morning measurement) and t2
(end of workday measurement) as predictors on the
day level (n  475 observations) and personality as
well as demographic controls as predictors on the
person level (n  102 participants). Predictors on
the day level were centered around the mean of
each person. This method of centering ensured that
relations on the day level were unconfounded by
person-level variance (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
Results
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations,
variance proportions, and intercorrelations of the
main variables. Correlations above the diagonal are
day-level correlations. Correlations below the diag-
onal are person-level correlations. Variance propor-
tions indicate the proportion of day-level and per-
son-level variance in the daily measures. For the
dependent variable creativity, 55 percent of the
variance was on the level of days and 45 percent
was on the level of persons. If creativity was re-
gressed on the person-level variables (i.e., age, gen-
der, tenure, highest educational level, organiza-
tional size, five factors of personality), only
extraversion (  .17, p  .02) and openness to
experience (  .15, p  .04) significantly pre-
dicted between-person variance in creativity.
These relations are in line with past research on
creativity and personality and provide support for
the construct validity of the daily measure of cre-
ativity (Feist, 1999). As person-level variables do
not provide potential alternative explanations for
the hypothesized relationships, we did not include
them in the hierarchical linear models presented in
Table 2 (Becker, 2005). Person-level variables can
only account for between-person variance in cre-
ativity, whereas the hypothesized relationships re-
fer to within-person variance in creativity, that is,
fluctuations in creativity between days indepen-
dent of between-person differences. Between-
person variance in the independent variables was
removed through person-mean centering (Enders &
Tofighi, 2007). Inclusion of person-level control
variables should therefore leave results unaffected.
To test this assumption, all analyses that are pre-
sented below were rerun with control variables. As
expected, inclusion of person-level control vari-
ables did not change results.
Test of hypotheses. Results are displayed in Ta-
ble 2. Hypothesis 1 proposed that negative affect at
t1 moderates the relation between positive affect at
t2 and creativity. In support of the hypothesis, the
interaction term between negative affect (t1) and
positive affect (t2) in model 2 was significant and
explained variance in addition to the positive main
effect of positive affect (  .44, p  .02, R2 
1%). The moderating effect of negative affect is
displayed in Figure 2a. The relation between posi-
tive affect (t2) and creativity was more positive if
negative affect (t1) was high rather than low. Thus,
in line with expectations, the sequence of negative
affect in the morning of a workday followed by
positive affect during the day was related to
creativity.
We performed additional analyses to rule out the
alternative explanation that the findings for Hy-
pothesis 1 reflect a mere contrast effect on percep-
tion. That is, there may be a bias to perceive a
workday in a more positive light if negative affect
was high in the morning (t1) and positive affect was
high during the day (t2). In the case of a contrast
effect, participants would not be more creative but
would only perceive themselves as more creative.
Such a contrast effect should not be creativity-spe-
cific but also influence evaluations of other aspects
of a workday. To rule out this possibility, we in-
cluded a four-item measure on perceived strain in
the survey at the end of each day as a nonequiva-
lent dependent variable (Cohen & Williamson,
1988). Positive affect at t2 was negatively related to
perceived strain. However, negative affect at t1 did
not moderate the relationship between positive af-
fect at t2 and perceived strain. This result speaks
against a contrast effect as the moderating effect of
negative affect at t1 was creativity-specific.
Hypothesis 2 addressed the relation between
change in affect from t1 to t2 with creativity. To
examine the relation between change in affect dur-
ing a day and creativity, three different methods
were used: raw score change, residual change, and
higher-order interactions. By using multiple meth-
ods to examine change, limitations of each method
can be addressed and the robustness of results can
438 AprilAcademy of Management Journal
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be examined (Campbell & Kenny, 1999). The mea-
sure of raw score change in negative affect was
obtained by subtracting t1 negative affect from t2
negative affect. The measure thus reflects how
many scale points negative affect had increased or
decreased between t1 and t2 on the five-point Likert
scale. To compute the raw score change in positive
affect, t1 positive affect was subtracted from t2 pos-
itive affect. To test Hypothesis 2, the interaction
between the two change scores was computed and
entered in a regression with creativity as the depen-
dent variable. In support of the hypothesis, change
in negative affect moderated the relation between
change in positive affect and creativity (model 3: 
.30, p .01, R2 3%). An increase in positive
affect was positively related to creativity if there
was a decrease in negative affect. Note that the
main effect of change in positive affect was not
significant; the underlying reason is that raw score
change confounds the starting values at t1 and de-
gree of change. Given equal variances at the two
measurement points, change scores are necessarily
negatively correlated with starting values (Camp-
bell & Kenny, 1999). In this study, the correlation
(r) between positive affect at t1 and change in pos-
itive affect was .61 (p  .01); the correlation be-
tween negative affect at t1 and change in negative
affect was .55 (p  .01). According to raw score
change, a strong increase in positive affect between
t1 and t2 thus implies low positive affect at t1.
Hypothesis 2, however, does not suggest that low
positive affect at t1 should be beneficial for creativ-
ity. The residual change method addresses this lim-
itation of raw score change by essentially simulat-
ing that all t1 values were the same (Rogosa, Brandt,
& Zimowski, 1982).1
Results in models 4 and 5 reflect residual change
in affect from t1 to t2 because positive and negative
affect at t1 are controlled for. Residual change refers
to the deviation of actual t2 values from those that
would be expected based on t1 values. The coeffi-
cients for t2 positive and negative affect estimate
the relation between residual changes in affect from
t1 to t2 with creativity. In model 4, change in posi-
tive affect was positively related to creativity;
change in negative affect was unrelated to creativ-
ity. The interaction between residual change in
positive and negative affect was used to test Hy-
1 As a consequence of statistically equating t1 values,
residual change departs from raw score and common
sense conceptualizations of change. Due to regression
toward the mean, the predicted values at t2 are always
less extreme than those at t1. As a consequence, a situa-
tion in which raw score values are identical at t1 and t2
qualifies as change. For instance, for a person who scores
1 s.d. above the mean on positive affect at t1 and t2, there
will be an increase in positive affect because the t2 value
is higher than what would be expected based on the t1
value. For a detailed discussion, please refer to Campbell
and Kenny (1999).
TABLE 2
Hierarchical Linear Models with Creativity as the Dependent Variablea
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept 2.26** (0.06) 2.27** (0.06) 2.25 (0.06) 2.26** (0.06) 2.25 (0.06)
Positive affect at t1 0.11
† (0.06) 0.11† (0.06)
Negative affect at t1 0.01 (0.09) 0.03 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.08 (0.09)
Positive affect at t2 0.29** (0.06) 0.29** (0.06) 0.26** (0.06) 0.25** (0.06)
Negative affect at t2 0.00 (0.08) 0.09 (0.09)
Negative affect at t1  positive affect at t2 0.44* (0.18) 0.39* (0.18)
Positive affect  negative affect (residual change) 0.36* (0.16)
Positive affect (t2 – t1) 0.07 (0.05)
Negative affect (t2 – t1) 0.07 (0.07)
Positive affect (t2 – t1)  negative affect (t2 – t1) 0.30** (0.09)
Pseudo-R² .06 .07 .03 .06 .08
a Creativity is the dependent variable. The values are unstandardized parameter estimates for regression weights (). Standard errors are
indicated in parentheses. n  475 observations nested within 102 individuals. R2 is the within-person variance explained in creativity by
the variables in the model.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
Two-tailed test.
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pothesis 2.2 In support of Hypothesis 2, the inter-
action term in model 5 was significant (  .36,
p  .03, R2  1%). As displayed in Figure 2b, the
relation between residual change in positive affect
and creativity was more positive if there was a
decrease rather than an increase in negative affect
from t1 to t2. In contrast to raw score change, for
residual change, an increase in positive affect from
t1 to t2 does not imply low positive affect at t1. In
fact, t1 positive affect was (marginally) significantly
related to creativity even after controlling for t2
positive affect. Days with high levels of creativity
2 To obtain the interaction term, residual values were
first computed separately for positive affect and negative
affect and then multiplied. Residual values were ob-
tained by regressing t2 positive affect on t1 positive affect
and t2 negative affect on t1 negative affect in two separate
regressions and by saving the residual values as
variables.
FIGURE 2
Negative Affect as a Moderator of the Relation between Positive Affect and Creativity
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were thus characterized by high rather than low
positive affect in the morning and a further increase
in positive affect during the day.
The third method for examining change in affect
and creativity involved higher order interactions.
This is the methodologically optimal approach and
allows for a simultaneous test of Hypotheses 1 and
2 (cf. Edwards & Parry, 1993).3 As this method
leads to equivalent results, and as a detailed illus-
tration introduces additional complexity, we only
briefly summarize the method and its results. We
regressed creativity on positive and negative affect
at t1 and t2. In addition, we entered the six possible
two-way interaction terms, the four possible three-
way interaction terms, and the one possible four-
way interaction term. The four-way interaction was
significant (p  .03). Graphical inspection of the
four-way interaction showed that the relation be-
tween positive affect at t2 and creativity was more
positive if negative affect at t1 was high rather than
low. Second, the relation between positive affect at
t2 and creativity was more positive if negative affect
at t2 was low. Third, results showed that there was
a higher level of creativity if positive affect at t1 was
high rather than low. All three methods to examine
change in affect thus supported Hypothesis 2.
Discussion
Study 1 provided evidence that a dynamic inter-
play of positive and negative affect was related to
creativity: Workdays on which participants
showed their highest levels of creativity were char-
acterized by the presence of positive and negative
affect in the morning and a subsequent increase in
positive affect and a decrease in negative affect.
Two main limitations of Study 1 need to be pointed
out. First, plausible alternative causal explanations
cannot be ruled out. As positive affect at t2 and
creativity were concurrently measured, an increase
in positive affect and a decrease in negative affect
may have been the consequence rather than the
cause of creativity (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994).
Second, only overall change in affect during a
workday and the relation with overall creativity
were studied. During a day, however, there are
many short-term changes in affect and varying lev-
els of creativity. Whether or not short-term changes
in affect are linked to the emergence of specific
ideas could not be examined in Study 1.
STUDY 2
In order to address the limitations of Study 1, we
conducted an experimental study in a controlled
laboratory setting. We induced an affective shift
and examined its impact on creativity compared to
a condition in which only positive affect was in-
duced. An affective shift concerned short-term
change in affect in the time frame of several min-
utes. The experiment tested the assumption that an
affective shift leads to higher creativity because of
its content-independent effect on cognitive func-
tioning. According to PSI theory, down-regulation
of negative affect activates associative networks of
memory that form the basis for new associations
(Kuhl, 2001). Due to this activation, participants
should show higher creativity on a task even if they
have not processed information relevant to that
task during a preceding phase of negative affect.
Methods
Design and participants. Eighty master’s stu-
dents of psychology (75% women) participated in
the experiment for a compensation of 5€ each. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions. In the control condition, participants
worked on an affectively neutral task followed by
the induction of positive affect. In the affective shift
condition, negative affect was induced first and
positive affect subsequently. Participants’ creativ-
ity was then assessed via a brainstorming task.
Procedure and manipulation. We adapted an
experimental paradigm and procedures to manipu-
late affect and to measure creativity from DeDreu et
al. (2008). The experiment was administered in
group sessions with ten participants. In each group,
individual participants were randomly assigned to
the experimental or the control condition. Partici-
pants were asked to participate in three indepen-
dent, eight-minute, paper-and-pencil tasks. They
were told that the first two tasks concerned autobi-
ographical memory and that the third task con-
cerned brainstorming. The experimenter controlled
the timing and told participants when to proceed to
the next task. In the affective shift condition, par-
ticipants were first asked to write a short essay (one
page maximum) about a situation that made them
feel afraid, distressed, or nervous. They were asked
to remember the situation as vividly and in as
3 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for
pointing this out.
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much detail as possible and to underline the parts
of their text that described what caused their feel-
ings. In the control condition, participants were
asked to write down in detail all activities they had
carried out the previous day. This task is used to
induce a neutral affective state that can be com-
pared to an experimentally manipulated affective
state (Fong, 2006). Once they had finished the first
task, participants rated how negative and how pos-
itive they felt on two five-point rating scales. These
ratings were used as manipulation checks. The next
task was the same for both experimental condi-
tions: All participants were asked to write a short
essay (one page maximum) about a situation that
made them feel happy, inspired, or enthusiastic.
Again, they were asked to remember the situation
as vividly and in as much detail as possible and to
underline the parts of their text that described what
caused their feelings. After completion of the sec-
ond task, participants again rated how negative and
how positive they felt on two five-point rating
scales.
Participants were then asked to proceed to a
brainstorming task. They were informed that their
university needs to constantly improve its quality
of teaching and that the departmental teaching staff
was interested in their ideas about ways in which
teaching could be improved. Participants were
asked to brainstorm and write down in bullet
points as many ideas, solutions, or suggestions they
could think of on how teaching could be improved.
After eight minutes, participants were requested to
stop writing down new ideas and to answer a short
questionnaire. Afterward, participants were de-
briefed regarding the purpose of the study.
Dependent variables. Based on Guilford (1967),
three facets of creativity were derived as dependent
variables from participants’ performance on the
brainstorming task: originality, creative fluency,
and cognitive flexibility. Two independent raters,
who were blind to experimental conditions and
study hypotheses, rated participants’ responses re-
garding the three facets of creativity. To examine
interrater reliability, Pearson’s correlations and in-
traclass correlation coefficients (ICC[C,k]) were cal-
culated. ICC[C,k] values indicate the reliability of
the average between two raters (McGraw & Wong,
1996). We report this coefficient, as the average
values between raters on the three facets of creativ-
ity were used to test hypotheses. For originality, the
two raters assessed the originality of each partici-
pant’s ideas on a scale from 1 (“not original at all”)
to 7 (“very original”). Interrater reliability was ac-
ceptable (r  .52, ICC[C,k]  .68). For creative
fluency, the two raters counted the number of
unique ideas each participant had generated (r 
.99, ICC[C,k] .99). Third, cognitive flexibility was
measured by the number of content categories par-
ticipants had used when generating ideas (r  .61,
ICC[C,k]  .76). The raters assigned each unique
idea to one of seven categories identified by DeDreu
et al. (2008): university environment, student facil-
ities, student quality, teaching materials, teachers,
policy, and other issues. A higher number of cate-
gories used by a participant reflects greater cogni-
tive flexibility. Participants were also asked to self-
assess their creativity on the brainstorming task to
examine convergence of rater evaluations and self-
report. We adapted two items from the experience-
sampling study to the present task (“I showed orig-
inality in my answers” and “I served as a good role
model for creativity”). The multiple correlation (R)
between participants’ self-reported creativity and
rater evaluations of the three aspects of creativity
was .43 (p  .01).
Results
Manipulation check. We used a two (group: ex-
perimental, control) by two (time: time 1, time 2)
mixed analysis of variance with time as a within-
subjects factor to examine whether the experimen-
tal manipulation was successful. The dependent
variables were positive and negative affect, which
we measured at t1 (after the first manipulation) and
at t2 (after the second manipulation). For the de-
pendent variable negative affect, the group factor
(F[1, 78]  10.38, p  .01), the time factor (F[1, 78]
 33.94, p  .01), and their interaction were sig-
nificant (F[1, 78]  8,42 p  .01). Examination of
simple main effects with adjustment for multiple
comparisons showed that negative affect was sig-
nificantly higher in the experimental group com-
pared to the control group at t1 after the negative
affect manipulation (mean  2.74 vs. mean  2.00,
s.e. .19, p .01). The induction of negative affect
had thus been successful. After the induction of
positive affect (t2), there was no significant differ-
ence in negative affect between the experimental
and control groups (mean  1.95 vs. mean  1.74,
s.e.  .15, p  .16). Moreover, change in negative
affect from t1 to t2 was significant only for the
experimental group (mean  2.74 vs. mean  1.95,
s.e.  .12, p  .01). The affect inductions thus
produced the intended decrease in negative affect
only for the experimental condition. For the depen-
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dent variable positive affect, the group factor was
nonsignificant (F[1, 78] 1.7, p .19), whereas the
time factor (F[1, 78]  42.96, p  .01) and the time
by group factor (F[1, 78]  10.08, p  .01) were
significant. At t1, positive affect was significantly
lower in the experimental group compared to the
control group (mean  2.98 vs. mean  3.47, s.e. 
.20, p  .02). At t2, there was no significant differ-
ence in positive affect between the experimental
and control groups (mean  3.81 vs. mean  3.76,
s.e.  .19, p  .80). For both groups, the increase in
positive affect from t1 to t2 was significant. In sum,
these results confirm that the manipulations had
their intended effects. Only the experimental group
reported an affective shift, that is, an episode of
negative affect followed by a decrease in negative
affect and an increase in positive affect. The control
group showed only an increase in positive affect
and no change in negative affect.
Group comparison. Table 3 shows the differ-
ences between the control group and the experi-
mental group on the three dependent variables that
reflect different aspects of creativity. For originality
and cognitive flexibility, there was a significant
difference between groups (p .02). Participants in
the affective shift condition showed higher origi-
nality and higher cognitive flexibility as compared
to the positive affect condition. For creative fluency
(that is, the number of ideas participants generated)
there were no significant differences.
Discussion
Study 2 showed that an experimentally induced
affective shift from negative to positive affect dur-
ing a time interval of several minutes led to higher
creativity than did a mere increase in positive af-
fect. Interestingly, participants in the affective shift
condition showed higher originality and higher
flexibility, which are two aspects of idea quality.
No differences were found for fluency of ideas,
which refers to idea quantity. Although this finding
was not expected, it is compatible with the out-
lined theoretical perspective. A decrease in nega-
tive affect should primarily activate remote associ-
ations and thereby increase originality and
flexibility rather than idea quantity (Baumann &
Kuhl, 2002).
In contrast to Study 1, the experimental design of
Study 2 provided support for the causal claim that
an affective shift leads to creativity. This finding
does not, however, rule out the plausible proposi-
tion that a reverse causal effect also exists and that
creativity has an influence on subsequent affect
(Amabile et al., 2005). It is further noteworthy that
the induction of negative affect at t1 led not only to
higher negative affect but also to lower positive
affect, demonstrating that negative affect inhibits
positive affect. A limitation of Study 2 is that time
frames and other possible sequences of affective
states were not systematically manipulated. Future
research on the dynamics of affect may, for in-
stance, examine the consequences for creativity if
positive affect is followed by negative affect, or if
positive affect or negative affect are sustained over
a longer period.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this article was to move toward a
balanced and dynamic account of the roles that
positive and negative affect play in the creative
process. In contrast to past models of creativity, we
proposed that a dynamic interplay of positive and
negative affect leads to creativity. We tested this
proposition in two studies. In Study 1, high creativ-
ity resulted if negative affect in the morning was
followed by a decrease in negative affect and an
increase in positive affect during the day. In Study
2, a short-term affective shift was experimentally
induced. Participants in the affective shift condi-
tion showed higher originality and higher cognitive
flexibility on a subsequent brainstorming task as
compared to a positive affect condition. Positive
consequences for creativity were thus observed for
TABLE 3
Between-Group Differences on Three Dimensions of Creativity
Creativity Dimension
Control Group Affective Shift Condition Group Comparison
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. F(1,78) p
Originality 3.53 0.98 4.12 1.13 6.22 .02
Cognitive flexibility 2.87 1.07 3.48 1.27 5.28 .02
Creative fluency 8.79 3.43 9.19 3.70 0.25 .62
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an affective shift during the time frame of several
minutes and during the time frame of one workday.
The functions of negative affect for creativity
may have been previously overlooked because of
the close link between positive affect and creativ-
ity, and because negative affect is often conceptu-
alized as the opposite of positive affect (Amabile et
al., 2005). The present studies shed light on how
negative affect—in concert with positive affect—
contributes to creativity. An episode of negative
affect can lay the foundation for high creativity at a
later point in time, and a decrease in negative affect
serves a distinctive function. A dynamic perspec-
tive on the affect-creativity link thus suggests that
the regulation of negative affect plays a key role for
achieving high levels of creativity. On the one
hand, people need to be capable of tolerating epi-
sodes of negative affect; on the other hand, the
ability to down-regulate negative affect is critical
(cf. Koole, Kuhl, Jostmann, & Vohs, 2005).
Limitations
A limitation of the two studies is that we did not
measure the cognitive processes that link changes
in affect to creativity. More specifically, we did not
disentangle to what extent the information people
processed during an episode of negative affect in-
fluenced subsequent creativity. We argued that
negative affect can contribute to creativity because
it focuses cognitive processing on discrepant infor-
mation, so that a person develops a detailed and
objective understanding of a situation. We further
proposed that an affective shift activates associa-
tive networks of memory, so that new associations
can be formed. In Study 1, creativity can have been
affected by the information people processed dur-
ing a phase of negative affect and by the activating
effect of an affective shift on associative knowledge
networks. The finding that negative affect at t1 and
a decrease in negative affect from t1 to t2 explained
incremental variance in creativity supports the as-
sumption that creativity was affected by both me-
diating processes. However, as we did not measure
the information people processed and the content
of creativity, the relative contribution of these me-
diating processes and their interplay could not be
examined. Study 2 tested the hypothesis that an
affective shift has an effect on creativity that is
independent of the cognitive content people pro-
cess during a preceding episode of negative affect.
As participants were unaware of the content of the
brainstorming task until after the affective shift,
only the content-independent effect of an affective
shift on cognitive functioning can have influenced
creativity. We thus did not examine what role the
task-related information people process during an
episode of negative affect plays in the affective shift
process and for subsequent creativity.
The interface between affect and cognition in the
creative process therefore requires future research
attention. In particular, research can examine how
the overall influence of change in affect on cogni-
tive functioning affects the processing of specific
cognitive content, such as the identification and
elaboration of work-related problems and the gen-
eration of creative solutions. For instance, change
in affect may be involved if an incubation period
enhances creativity. Unconscious cognitive pro-
cesses may be elicited while negative affect is pres-
ent and a person becomes aware of a problem.
Unconscious processes during a subsequent phase
of incubation, in which the focus of attention is
distracted from the problem, can influence creativ-
ity (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Zhong, Dijkster-
huis, & Galinsky, 2008). Evidence regarding
whether an incubation period actually contributes
to creativity is, however, mixed (Sio & Ormerod,
2009). A critical contingency may be whether or
not an incubation period is accompanied by a shift
from negative to positive affect.
A potential methodological limitation concerns
the use of self-report measures of affect and creativ-
ity in Study 1. Regarding creativity, we argue that
self-report may be the most valid means of mea-
surement for a person’s creativity on a particular
workday (cf. Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade,
Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Shalley, Gilson, & Blum,
2009). The development of new and useful ideas
within the time frame of one day does not imply
that people talk about these ideas or implement
ideas right away. Creativity on any particular day is
therefore not necessarily observed by others or re-
flected in objective outcomes. Moreover, evidence
for the validity of the self-report measure was pro-
vided by the finding in Study 2 that self-reported
creativity was correlated with the scores of two
raters. A limitation of the self-report measurement
of affect in Study 1 is that we examined only con-
sciously accessible positive and negative affect. Af-
fective processes that regulate cognitive function-
ing are, however, only partially consciously
accessible (Barsade, Ramarajan, & Westen, 2009;
Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009), which suggests that
we have captured only a fragment of the actual
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affective processes, and that the overall influence
of affect on creativity may be more pronounced.
Implications for Research and Practice
In line with George (2011), this article recom-
mends a focus on the joint and interactive effects of
positive and negative affect in future research on
affect in organizations. Conceptualizing and mea-
suring positive and negative affect as two poles of
one dimension, by contrast, hinders an understand-
ing of their distinct functions. Moreover, a focus on
the dynamics of affect and the mechanism respon-
sible for these dynamics may lead to new insights
and to reinterpretations of findings in creativity
research and other domains (e.g., Filipowicz, Bar-
sade, & Melwani, 2011). For instance, in experi-
mental studies that found increased creativity after
inducing negative affect, causality was usually at-
tributed to the affective state of a person (e.g., De
Dreu et al., 2008). A dynamic perspective offers a
different interpretation: It may not be negative af-
fect per se that leads to increased creativity, but
rather the self-regulatory mechanisms used to over-
come negative affect, which are activated as a con-
sequence of negative affect.
We would like to highlight avenues for future
research that may further our understanding of the
process that we call the affective shift. First, an
affective shift can have consequences for variables
other than creativity. For instance, Bledow,
Schmitt, Frese, and Kuehnel (2011) found that soft-
ware engineers showed high levels of work engage-
ment if they experienced the sequence of negative
events such as failures followed by positive mood.
Future research may want to determine the com-
mon denominator of the consequence of an affec-
tive shift. A related research question concerns the
extent to which variability in affect is adaptive. Our
theoretical propositions imply that a certain
amount of variability across the spectrum of affec-
tive experiences is adaptive in addition to a high
baseline level of positive affect (Diener & Diener,
1996). However, there is a fine line between
adaptive variability in affect and nonadaptive emo-
tional instability (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Nezlek,
Dossche, & Timmermans, 2007).
A further research question concerns the time
frames in which an affective shift occurs and
whether it has similar consequences across differ-
ent time frames. Our theoretical rationale suggests
that an affective shift may have similar conse-
quences across different time frames if the under-
lying psychological processes are the same. Poten-
tial time frames can span from milliseconds to
years, and affective shifts in different time frames
are interwoven. An artist, for instance, may reach a
period of peak creativity after emerging from a
long-lasting crisis (Jamison, 1995). During the pe-
riod of peak creativity, there may be short-term
affective shifts that influence creative performance
on specific pieces of art.
The present research points to the importance of
affect regulation as potential leverage for increasing
creativity and innovation in organizations. People
are usually unaware of how affect influences cog-
nitive processing and creativity (Amabile et al.,
2005). An awareness and understanding of the dual
tuning of cognition through positive and negative
affect may be a first step toward making better use
of one’s own creative potential and facilitating cre-
ativity in others (George, 2011). From our perspec-
tive, a one-sided focus on increasing positive affect
to improve creativity is ill-advised. Creativity re-
quires complexity in terms of affective and cogni-
tive processes and an integration of this complexity
(Bledow, Frese, Anderson, Erez, & Farr, 2009).
Affect-regulation plays a key role in this integra-
tion and in maintaining an adaptive balance be-
tween positive and negative affect (Fredrickson &
Losada, 2005).
Moreover, people may face different challenges
for improving their creativity, depending on how
they regulate affect, and we assume that different
strategies are effective. For people who remain for a
prolonged period in the mode of cognitive process-
ing that is induced by negative affect, strategies that
facilitate down-regulation of negative thoughts and
feelings may prove beneficial—for instance, tech-
niques of self-relaxation and seeking out a socially
supportive work environment (e.g., Grossman,
Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004). By contrast,
the creativity of people who quickly down-regulate
negative affect may benefit from an increased tol-
erance of negative thoughts and feelings, such that
negative affect is not brushed aside too quickly. A
deliberate focus on information that elicits negative
affect may be effective, for instance, by questioning
preferred alternatives or by reflecting on barriers
that could hinder goal pursuit (e.g., Oettingen,
Mayer, Thorpe, Janetzke, & Lorenz, 2005). A crucial
point is that not all people will benefit from the
same strategies.
We argue that a one-sided focus on positive affect
is also insufficient for leaders who intend to in-
crease employee creativity. Leaders will be more
446 AprilAcademy of Management Journal
effective if they understand and influence the dy-
namic interplay of positive and negative affect
(Lord, Hannah, & Jennings, 2011). In some situa-
tions, leaders may be better advised to turn employ-
ees’ attentions to problematic aspects of a situation
and to induce negative affect. A prerequisite for the
effectiveness of such a strategy is that employees
have the ability to deal with negative affect. In
situations in which negative affect is already pres-
ent, helping employees to down-regulate negative
affect and to increase positive affect should be a
particularly effective strategy for increasing creativ-
ity (cf. House, Spangler, & Woycke, 1991).
To sum up, we return to the analogy of the phoe-
nix. The symbolic meaning of the phoenix is not
embedded in its static features, which are observ-
able at any point in time, but in the process of
decline and renewal that unfolds over time. In a
comparable way, a focus on static variables such as
psychological states or traits is insufficient for ex-
plaining and influencing creativity in organiza-
tions. We think a theoretically valid and practically
useful account of creativity in organizations will
benefit from a focus on the dynamic processes from
which creativity arises.
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